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finally from their dispositions. Wherever you find them,^^®^ 
surround them with noble, great and ingenious forms, en-
close them all round with the symbols of excellence, 
until actuality is overpowered by appearance and Nature 
7, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
and Absolute Idealism 
It is quite fitting for a number of reasons that this chap­
ter on the post-Enlightenment should conclude with a section on 
Hegel's interpretation of idealism. He gave expression to most 
of the criticisms of the Enlightenment, and appropriated many 
of its constructive suggestions. He gave voice and content to 
the later period's demand for a positive and constructive phi­
losophy, one which made room for ethics, art, and religion. 
The influence of his thought was tremendous, immediately in 
Prussia where it became a philosophical basis for the expansion 
of that state, and later as it spread to England and the United 
States, where it became the leading school of philosophy for 
some time. Another way of indicating the position of Hegel's 
idealism is to recognize the fact that most of our contemporary 
twentieth century philosophy represents some form of criticism 
of idealism as it was expressed by Hegel, 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) enjoyed a life 
singularly lacking in upheavals, either inward or outward. He 
experienced none of the inner tensions which characterized the 
lives of the romantics. And outwardly, even the defeat of the 
German forces by Napoleon at Jena, where Hegel was teaching, 
seems to have left him singularly untouched. This combination 
of inner and outer calm manifested itself in the spectator at­
titude which pervades his thought, and serves to contrast him 
sharply with both his predecessors and his followers. 
Hegel was educated at the university in Tubingen, where he 
was a friend of the future romantic philosopher, Schelling. 
Until his university appointment at Jena in 1801 Hegel served 
as a private tutor. Napoleon's attack on Jena in 1806 ended 
the first phase of his teaching career; but by that time he had 
written the Phenomenology of Mind (Geist), which was published 
the following year and set"~The ¥fage for most of his later 
thought. At last, in 1818, he was called to the University of 
Berlin to take the chair of philosophy formerly held by the 
* On the Aesthetic Education of Man In a Series of Letters by 
Friedrich Schiller, trans. Reginald Snell~(London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1954)j pp. 37-55, Used with permission of 
the Yale University Press. 
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romantic nationalist, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), whose 
contribution to German nationalism will be noted in a later 
chapter. Here Hegel taught until his death in a cholera epi-
demic. With his movement from Jena to Berlin the center of 
gravity of German thought shifted from the little principali-
ties to the capital of Prussia. 
In addition to the Phenomenology Hegel completed several 
other major books during his lifetime; but he also left a vast 
amount of material in manuscript form. This latter material 
was in various stages of completion. Most of it was later 
edited and published by Hegel's relatives and students. It is 
understandable that there should be wide differences of opinion 
about this second group of works. Our selection, taken from 
one of the posthumous works, The Philosophy of History, appears 
to have been one of those manuscripts which was left in rather 
complete form. 
Hegel was very critical of all philosophical thought which 
had preceded him. He was critical of the English enlighteners 
because of their separation of reason and experience, of the 
a priori and a posteriori elements, which in the thought of 
Hume seemed to lead to nothing but skepticism. He was very 
critical of Kant for a similar separation of the phenomenal and 
noumenal aspects of reality; this separation meant, for Hegel, 
that reality was forever unknowable. Kant's further separation 
of the theoretical and practical aspects of life suggested to 
Hegel that in the realm of human action there was no law that 
governed events. If men were to act only "as if" there were 
such things as laws, this implied that history was something in 
which "anything goes," and therefore unintelligible. Finally, 
Hegel was critical of romanticism which emphasized the subject-
ive aspects. Sentimentalism, mysticism, poetic genius, pious-
ness, the sensitive soul, imagination, visions, and phantasy he 
avoided on the grounds that they were completely unrealistic. 
And yet Hegel drew heavily on all these schools of thought 
which he so emphatically criticized. From the empiricists he 
took the emphasis on experience, although he enlarged that con-
cept to include social and historical as well as personal and 
individual experience. And he insisted that reason was present 
in this enlarged experience, not something to be added to it or 
imposed on it. He took from Kant the emphasis on mind and the 
laws of its action, but enlarged this also to such an extent 
that mind was no longer merely regulative or legislative for 
experience, but legislative for all of reality as well: "The 
real is the rational and the rational is the real." Mind was 
an objective rather than a subjective element. Thus Hegel's 
thought is to be characterized as an objective idealism, and, 
because he substituted one all-inclusive Mind, which he called 
the Absolute, for the many minds of Berkeley and Kant, Hegel's 
thought is referred to as absolute idealism. From the roman-
ticists he took the emphasis on will and striving, on passion 
and struggle, but this aspect of experience he endowed with 
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reason, thus combining rationality and will. This combination 
he called Geist. And he laid down a law of this Geist or 
Spirit, which is known as the dialectic. The result of all 
this was one of the most comprehensive and important metaphys-
ical systems of Western Civilization. 
Into the make-up of Hegel's system went several important 
major ideas much older than those of his immediate predecessors. 
One of these ideas harked back to the Greeks, whom Hegel greatly 
admired. It was the idea that each thing, person, or event 
could only be understood in terms of the whole of which it was 
nothing more than a part. Because the relations between each 
particular and the whole are rational and because they determine 
the very nature of each particular, they are not only epistemo-
logical relations, but metaphysical as well. When we try to 
understand any particular (little part) thing we find that it 
is a part of a whole which, in turn, is part of an even greater 
whole. There is no stopping of this process short of the total 
whole, or Absolute, of which all things are but parts. 
Basic to Hegel's thought is the idea that the whole, or 
Absolute, or God, is both self-complete and self-explanatory. 
There is nothing above or beyond this whole. The only trans-
cendence in the system is that of the whole over its parts. 
Hegel's Absolute is a Mind whose nature is a combination of 
both thought and will; and this is why Geist is often trans-
lated as "Mind." But this Mind is not a Creator in the usual 
sense of the word. It was Hegel's interpretation of the Mind 
of the Universe which characterizes his thought and serves to 
distinguish it from other idealisms such as those of Plato, 
Berkeley, or Kant. The emphasis in his idealism is thus on im-
manence rather than transcendence and, consequently, on the 
method by which the Absolute acts. 
This method is the famous dialectic, which is the second 
major idea in Hegel's system of thought and, some would add, 
Hegel's most important contribution. As soon as any mind 
starts to think or act it begins with a partial idea or an in-
complete action. No initial thought or act can be final or 
complete. But we can never wait until we know the Whole or are 
able to perform the perfect act, as the romantics had suggested. 
We must start when and where we are. Because each initial 
thought or act is only part of a larger whole, it immediately 
sets in operation the antagonism of the other parts of the same 
whole, just as the weights on one arm of a scales produce an 
equal and opposite reaction on the part of the other arm. The 
resolution of the tension between the opposing sides is not, as 
the enlighteners suggested, to strike a balance between them by 
means of compromise, but rather to press on to the more inclus-
ive idea or action which would include both of the opposing 
sides. The resulting synthesis is elevated (aufgehoben) to a 
higher level of thought or action. Here the analogy of the 
scales breaks down and, as one recent writer has suggested 
(Henry D. Aiken in The Age of Ideology), we are more accurate 
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if we use the analogy of a waltz. The three-quarter time car-
ries us through to a third step which completes the first two, 
while at the same time this third step becomes the start for a 
new series of steps, and so on to the end of the waltz, or un-
til we have arrived at the Absolute. Hegel calls this process 
the dialectic, and names each of the three stages: thesis, 
antithesis, and synthesis. 
Several things should be noted about this Hegelian dialec-
tic. In the first place it is inescapable. We have to think 
and act. Whenever we do we set in motion the dialectic. There 
is no way in which we, or even the Absolute, can avoid acting 
as parts of the Whole. Here once again the logical necessity 
of the Enlightenment is brought back into human experience. 
This necessity is no longer in terms of a first or final cause, 
but rather in terms of dialectical opposition. 
The second thing to note about the dialectic is that it is 
universal. It applies to nature as well as human history. In-
deed it views everything historically. Nature is seen in terms 
of history, rather than history in terms of nature, as some 
earlier thinkers had suggested. Man, woman, family: this is 
one of Hegel's illustrations of the application of the dialec-
tic to human institutions. Seed, soil, flower: this would 
illustrate its application to nature. Athenian liberty, Roman 
imperium, medieval nation states: this would illustrate the 
dialectic in history. In each case the thesis sets up its an-
tithesis, and the result is a synthesis. 
In the third place, we should note that the synthesis is 
not at all a compromise, but rather a new idea which is at once 
both complete and incomplete. It is an idea in which both the 
thesis and the antithesis are caught up onto a higher and more 
comprehensive level, and into a more complete whole. Nothing 
is lost because everything is taken up into the new synthesis. 
There is nothing of the idea of the lowest common denominator 
in the whole process. But the synthesis is also incomplete, 
and becomes the starting point for another round of the dialec-
tic. 
The third major idea in Hegel's thought is idealism. This 
has been implicit throughout what has already been said, but it 
is important enough to isolate and deal with separately. Mater-
ialism, either in the form that Hobbes or Holbach gave it, is 
completely rejected, and for reasons which are characteristic 
of the whole post-Enlightenment period. Hegel also rejected 
Locke's interpretation of ideas, for the same reasons that Ber-
keley gave. The ideas of Plato he rejected as well because 
their transcendence set them apart from the whole in which he 
was interested. Ideas were, for Hegel, the expression of Mind, 
as they were for Berkeley. But, in order for each of us to be 
able to understand them, our minds must also be parts of that 
one Mind which speaks to us through them. Thus Mind, for Hegel, 
determines and constitutes the whole of which we are all parts; 
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and the result is absolute idealism. 
With these three major emphases on the whole, the dialec-
tic, and idealism, Hegel constructed his system and made contri-
butions which served to give Western thought a new direction 
for some time to come. One of these was a new interpretation 
of logic which broke sharply with all earlier logic. Hegel's 
logic was dynamic, in contrast to the static logic of Aristotle, 
and the form which it took was dialectical rather than mechan-
ical. A second contribution came as a result of Hegel's em-
phasis on history, and helped to produce the historical approach 
with which we are today familiar in so many of our subjects. 
This historical emphasis was, in turn, to influence the biolog-
ical sciences, which, in Hegel's time, were beginning to explore 
the possibility of evolution. A third contribution was a new 
emphasis on the importance of culture in the development of 
human history. Hegel saw culture rather than nature as the de-
terminative factor, and thus made room for those aspects of the 
human spirit which the romantics were interested in furthering. 
And finally, Hegel's interpretation of religion as an inter-
mediate stage between the thesis of art and the synthesis of 
philosophy turned the approach to religion from something evan-
gelical and pietistic to what we know today as the philosophy of 
religion. 
Hegel's Philosophy of History, a series of lectures given 
at Berlin between 18i"2 and" 1831, was central to his whole phi-
losophy. In the introduction to these lectures, from which our 
selection is taken, he laid down the principles which were to 
be applied in the later parts to Oriental, Greek, Roman, and 
German history. Hegel devoted about one third of the lectures 
to this introductory section. In these lectures he showed how 
the objectivity of the Enlightenment and the subjectivity of 
romanticism could only be united when one took an historical 
approach. History also was the only sphere in which the con-
crete individual and the abstract universal could be synthesized. 
He offered this interpretation of history as the coming to self-
consciousness and self-knowledge of the Absolute in man, who 
alone is capable of knowing, and knowing that he knows; and who 
is capable of knowing what freedom means, and of following that 
meaning. He pointed out how the human spirit must cooperate 
with the spirit of history, and stressed the necessary role of 
the state. Both men and states, however, are but manifestations 
of that higher level of the whole, or culture, in which alone 
they find their true meaning. 
This monumental effort of Hegel's was no more successful 
than that of Aquinas in finding universal acceptance. Hegel 
did make room for such things as art, ethics, and religion, 
which the Enlightenment was charged with having neglected. But, 
in turn, there seemed to be great inadequacies in his system. 
In the first place, the dialectic failed to provide an adequate 
method for the physical sciences. In fact this was the area in 
which it appeared to be most inadequate. As a result, scien-
tists and many others were disillusioned by Hegelian speculations. 
MM—H^Hi 
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Returning to their own specialties, taking Kant as a guide for 
personal living, they left any generalizing to others. From 
this divorce both science and philosophy suffered severely. 
Nor was it possible to avoid a split among the followers 
of Hegel themselves over the issue of whether the dialectic had 
at last come to rest in a particular area, or whether it was 
still in motion. The right-wing Hegelians included those who 
insisted that in their own particular spheres, which tended to 
be either politics or religion, the final synthesis had been 
attained, that they had reached the Absolute. There was basis 
for this in Hegel's thought. He surely did seem to suggest 
that the dialectic had come to rest in the Prussian state, the 
Lutheran church, and his own philosophy. On the other hand, 
there were the left-wing Hegelians who emphasized the fact that 
no thesis was attained without its antithesis. Hegel had said 
this too. The result was an equally strong emphasis on opposi-
tion to the status quo, an opposition which could easily become 
more than philosophical. Thus Karl Marx (1818-1883) aligned 
himself with the left-wing group and preached a doctrine of 
revolution. 
A third and final problem remains to be raised. By his 
emphasis on the historical approach and the dialectical method 
Hegel took any straight-line characteristics out of history. 
Both theses and antitheses were equally parts of history. Also 
the emphasis on God's immanence tended to identify Him with 
each stage of the dialectic, giving to thesis as well as to 
antithesis equal value and validity. This tended to justify 
any historical stage, as well as its overthrow. The result was 
a loss of any moral priority such as Kant had suggested for 
judging between alternatives, and the introduction of power as 
the determining factor in history. Hegel's philosophy could be 
used to justify either what is or what ought to be. This cul-
minated in the introduction oT power in the sense that "might 
makes right." 
II. The enquiry into the essential destiny of Reason — 
as far as it is considered in reference to the World — is 
identical with the question, what is the ultimate design 
of the World? And the expression implies that that design 
is destined to be realised. Two points of consideration 
suggest themselves: first, the import of this design — 
its abstract definition; and secondly, its realization. 
It must be observed at the outset, that the phenomenon 
we investigate — Universal History — belongs to the realm 
of Spirit. The term "World," includes both physical and 
psychical Nature. Physical Nature also plays its part in 
the World's History, and attention will have to be paid to 
the fundamental natural relations thus involved. But 
Spirit, and the course of its development, is our substan-
tial object. Our task does not require us to contemplate 
Nature as a Rational System in itself — though in its own 
proper domain it proves itself such — but simply in its 
relation to Spirit. On the stage on which we are observing 
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it, — Universal History — Spirit displays itself in its 
most concrete reality. Notwithstanding this (or rather 
for the very purpose of comprehending the general prin-
ciples which this, its form of concrete reality, embodies) 
we must premise some abstract characteristics of the 
nature of Spirit. Such an explanation, however, cannot 
be given here under any other form than that of bare as-
sertion. The present is not the occasion for unfolding 
the idea of Spirit speculatively; for whatever has a 
place in an Introduction, must, as already observed, be 
taken as simply historical; something assumed as having 
been explained and proved elsewhere; or whose demonstra-
tion awaits the sequel of the Science or History itself. 
We have therefore to mention here: 
(1.) The abstract characteristics of the nature 
of Spirit. 
(2.) What means Spirit uses in order to realize 
its Idea. 
(3.) Lastly, we must consider the shape which the 
perfect embodiment of Spirit assumes — the 
State. 
(1.) The nature of Spirit may be understood by a 
glance at its direct opposite — Matter. As the essence 
of Matter is Gravity, so, on the other hand, we may af-
firm that the substance, the essence of Spirit is Freedom. 
All will readily assent to the doctrine that Spirit, 
among other properties, is also endowed with Freedom; but 
philosophy teaches that all the qualities of Spirit exist 
only through Freedom; that all are but means for attaining 
Freedom; that all seek and produce this and this alone. 
It is a result of speculative Philosophy, that Freedom is 
the sole truth of Spirit. Matter possesses gravity in 
virtue of its tendency towards a central point. It is 
essentially composite; consisting of parts that exclude 
each other. It seeks its Unity; and therefpre exhibits 
itself as self-destructive, as verging towards its oppo-
site [an indivisible point]. If it could attain this, it 
would be Matter no longer, it would have perished. It 
strives after the realization of its Idea; for in Unity 
it exists ideally. Spirit, on the contrary, may be de-
fined as that which has its centre in itself. It has not 
a unity outside itself, but has already found it; it 
exists in and with itself. Matter has its essence out of 
itself ;~~S"pirit is self-contained existence (Bei-sich-
selbst-seyn). Now this is Freedom, exactly. For if I am 
dependent, my being is referred to something else which I 
am not; I cannot exist independently of something external. 
I am free, on the contrary, when my existence depends upon 
myself. This self-contained existence of Spirit is none 
other than self-consciousness — consciousness of one's 
own being. Two things must be distinguished in conscious-
ness; first, the fact that J^  know; secondly, what I know. 
In self consciousness these are merged in one"; For Spirit 
knows itself. It involves an appreciation of its own 
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nature, as also an energy enabling it to realise itself; 
to make itself actually that which it is potentially. Ac-
cording to this abstract definition it may be said of 
Universal History, that it is the exhibition of Spirit in 
the process of working out the knowledge of that which it 
is potentially. And as the germ bears in itself the whole 
nature of the tree, and the taste and form of its fruits, 
so do the first traces of Spirit virtually contain the 
whole of that History. The Orientals have not attained 
the knowledge that Spirit -- Man as such — is free; and 
because they do not know this, they are not free. They 
only know that one is free. But on this very account, the 
freedom of that one -Ts only caprice; ferocity — brutal 
recklessness of passion, or a mildness and tameness of the 
desires, which is itself only an accident of Nature — 
mere caprice like the former, — That one is therefore 
only a Despot; not a free man. The consciousness of Free-
dom first arose among the Greeks, and therefore they were 
free; but they, and the Romans, likewise, knew only that 
some are free, — not man as such. Even Plato and Aris-
totle did not know this. The Greeks, therefore, had 
slaves; and their whole life and the maintenance of their 
splendid liberty, was implicated with the institution of 
slavery: a fact moreover, which made that liberty on the 
one hand only an accidental, transient and limited growth; 
on the other hand, constituted it a rigorous thraldom of 
our common n a t u r e - — of the Human. The German nations, 
under the influence of Christianity, were the first to at-
tain the consciousness, that man, as man, is free: that 
it is the freedom of Spirit which constitutes its essence. 
This consciousness arose first in religion, the inmost 
region of Spirit; but to introduce the principle into the 
various relations of the actual world, involves a more ex-
tensive problem than its simple implantation; a problem 
whose solution and application require a severe and length-
ened process of culture. In proof of this, we may note 
that slavery did not cease immediately on the reception of 
Christianity. Still less did liberty predominate in 
States; or Governments and Constitutions adopt a rational 
organization, or recognise freedom as their basis.. That 
application of the principle to political relations; the 
thorough moulding and interpenetration of the constitution 
of society by it, is a process identical with history it-
self. I have already directed attention to the distinc-
tion here involved, between a principle as such, and its. 
application; i.e. its introduction and carrying out in the 
actual phenomena of Spirit and Life, This is a point of 
fundamental importance in our science, and one which must 
be constantly respected as essential. And in the same 
way as this distinction has attracted attention in view 
of the Christian principle of self-consciousness — Free-
dom; it~also shews itself as an essential one, in view of 
the principle of Freedom generally. The History of the 
world is none other than the progress of the consciousness 
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of Freedom; a progress whose development according to the 
necessity of its nature, it is our business to investigate. 
The general statement given above, of the various 
grades in the consciousness of Freedom — and which we 
applied in the first instance to the fact that the Eastern 
nations knew only that one is free; the Greek and Roman 
world only that some are free; whilst we know that all 
men absolutely (man as man) are free, -- supplies us with 
the natural division of Universal History, and suggests 
the mode of its discussion. This is remarked, however, 
only incidentally and anticipatively; some other ideas 
must be first explained. 
The destiny of the spiritual World, and, — since 
this is the substantial World, while the physical remains 
subordinate to it, or, in the language of speculation, has 
no truth jis against the spiritual, — the final cause of 
the World at large, we allege to be the consciousness of 
its own freedom on the part of Spirit, and ipso facto, the 
reality of that freedom. But that this term "Freedom," 
without further qualification, is an indefinite, and in-
calculable ambiguous term; and that while that which it 
represents is the ne plus ultra of attainment, it is li-
able to an infinity of misunderstandings, confusions and 
errors, and to become the occasion for all imaginable ex-
cesses, — has never been more clearly known and felt than 
in modern times. Yet, for the present, we must content 
ourselves with the term itself without farther definition. 
Attention was also directed to the importance of the in-
finite difference between a principle in the abstract, and 
its realization in the concrete. In the process before 
us, the essential nature of freedom, — which involves in 
it absolute necessity, — is to be displayed as coming to 
a consciousness of itself (for it is in its very nature, 
self-consciousness) and thereby realizing its existence. 
Itself is its own object of attainment, and the sole aim 
of Spirit. This result it is, at which the process of 
the World's History has been continually aiming, and to 
which the sacrifices that have ever and anon been laid on 
the vast altar of the earth, through the long lapse of 
ages, have been offered. This is the only aim that sees 
itself realized and fulfilled; the only pole of repose 
amid the ceaseless change of events and conditions, and 
the sole efficient principle that pervades them. This 
final aim is God's purpose with the world; but God is the 
absolutely perfect Being, and can, therefore, will nothing 
other than himself — his own Will. The Nature of His 
Will — that is, His Nature itself — is what we here call 
the Idea of Freedom; translating the language of Religion 
into that of Thought. The question, then, which we may 
next put, is: What means does this principle of Freedom 
use for its realization? This is the second point we have 
to consider. 
(2.) The question of the means by which Freedom de-
velops itself to a World, conducts us to the phenomenon of 
History itself. Although Freedom is, primarily an 
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undeveloped idea, the means it uses are external and phe-
nomenal; presenting themselves in History to our sensuous 
vision. The first glance at History convinces us that the 
actions of men proceed from their needs, their passions, 
their characters and talents; and impresses us with the 
belief that such needs, passions and interests are the 
sole springs of action -- the efficient agents in' this 
scene of activity. Among these may, perhaps, be found 
aims of a liberal or universal kind — benevolence it may 
be, or noble patriotism; but such virtues and general 
views are but insignificant as compared with the World 
and its doings. We may perhaps see the Ideal of Reason 
actualized in those who adopt such aims, and within the 
sphere of their influence; but they bear only a trifling 
proportion to the mass of the human race; and the extent 
of that influence is limited accordingly. Passions, pri-
vate aims, and the satisfaction of selfish desires, are 
on the other hand, most effective springs of action. 
Their power lies in the fact that they respect none of 
the limitations which justice and morality would impose 
on them; and that these natural impulses have a more 
direct influence over man than the artificial and tedious 
discipline that tends to order and self-restraint, law 
and morality........ 
We assert then that nothing has been accomplished 
without interest on the part of the actors; and — if 
interest foe called passion, inasmuch as the whole indi-
viduality, to the neglect of all other actual or possible 
interests and claims, is devoted to an object with every 
fibre of volition, concentrating all its desires and 
powers upon it — we may affirm absolutely that nothing 
great in the World has been accomplished without passion. 
Two elements, therefore, enter into the object of our ~~ 
investigation: the first the Idea, the second the com-
plex of human passions; the one the warp, the other the 
woof of the vast arras-web of Universal History, The 
concrete mean and union of the two is Liberty, under the 
conditions of morality in a State. We have spoken of the 
Idea of Freedom as the nature of Spirit, and the absolute 
goal of History. Passion is regarded as a thing of sin-
ister aspect, as more or less'immoral, Man is required 
to have no passions. Passion, it is true, is not quite 
the suitable word for what I wish to express, I mean 
here nothing more than human activity as resulting from 
private interests — special, or if you will, self-seeking 
designs, -- with this qualification, that the whole energy 
of Will and character is devoted to their attainment; 
that other interests, (which would in themselves consti-
tute attractive aims) or rather all things else, are sac-
rificed to them. The object in question is so bound up 
with the man's will, that it entirely and alone determines 
the "hue of resolution," and is inseparable from it. It 
has become the very essence of his volition. For a person 
is a specific existence; not man in general, (a term to 
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which no real existence corresponds) but a particular 
human being. The term "character" likewise expresses 
this idiosyncrasy of Will and Intelligence, But Char-
acter comprehends all peculiarities whatever; the way 
which a person conducts himself in private relations, 
in 
&c, 
and is not limited to his idiosyncrasy in its practical 
and active phase. I shall, therefore, use the term "pas-
sion;" understanding thereby the particular bent of char-
acter, as far as the peculiarities of volition are not 
limited to private interest, but supply the impelling and 
actuating force for accomplishing deeds shared in by the 
community at large. Passion is in the first instance the 
subjective, and therefore the formal side of energy, will 
and activity — leaving the object or aim still undeter-
mined. And there is a similar relation of formality to 
reality in merely individual conviction, individual views 
individual conscience. It is always a question of essen-
tial importance, what is the purport of my conviction, 
what the object of my passion, in deciding whether the 
one or the other is of a true and substantial nature. 
Conversely, if it is so, it will inevitably attain actual 
existence — be realized. 
From this comment on the second essential element in 
the historical embodiment of an aim, we infer —• glancing 
at the institution of the State in passing, — that a 
State is then well constituted and internally powerful, 
when the private interest of its citizens is one with the 
common interest of the State when the one finds its 
in the other, — a proposi-
But in a State many insti-
political machinery invented. 
gratification and realization 
tion in itself very important, 
tutions must be adopted, much 
accompanied by appropriate political arrangements, --
necessitating long struggles of the understanding before 
what is really appropriate can be discovered, — involving, 
moreover, contentions with private interest and passions, 
and a tedious discipline of these latter, in order to 
bring about the desired harmony. The epoch when a State 
attains this harmonious condition, marks the period of its 
bloom, its virtue, its vigour, and its prosperity. But 
the history of mankind does not begin with a conscious aim 
of any kind, as it is the case with the particular circles 
into which men form themselves of set purpose. The mere 
social instinct implies a conscious purpose of security 
for life and property; and when society has been consti-
The His-
• the 
implicit 
tuted, this purpose becomes more comprehensive, 
tory of the World begins with its general aim — 
realization of the Idea of Spirit — only in an 
form (an sich) that is, as Nature; a hidden, most pro-
foundly hidden, unconscious instinct; and the whole pro-
cess of History (as already observed), is directed to 
rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one. Thus 
appearing in the form of merely natural existence, natural 
will — that which has been called the subjective side, — 
physical craving, instinct, passion, private interest, as 
XII p. 97 
also opinion and subjective conception, — spontaneously 
present themselves at the very commencement. This vast 
congeries of volitions, interests and activities, con-
stitute the instruments and means of the World-Spirit for 
attaining its object; bringing it to consciousness, and 
realizing it. And this aim is none other than finding 
itself — coming to itself — and contemplating itself in 
concrete actuality. But that those manifestations of 
vitality on the part of individuals and peoples, in which 
they seek and satisfy their own purposes, are, at the 
same time, the means and instruments of a higher and 
broader purpose of which they know nothing, — which they 
realize unconsciously, — might be made a matter of ques-
tion; rather has been questioned, and in every variety 
of form negatived, decried and contemned as mere dreaming 
and "Philosophy." But on this point I announced my view 
at the very outset, and asserted our hypothesis, -- which, 
however, will appear in the sequel, in the form of a 
legitimate inference, — and our belief, that Reason 
governs the world, and has consequently governed its his-
tory. In relation to this independently universal and 
substantial existence — all else is subordinate, sub-
servient to it, and the means for its development. — The 
Union of Universal Abstract Existence generally with the 
Individual — the Subjective — that this alone is Truth, 
belongs to the department of speculation, and is treated 
in this general form in Logic. — But in the process of 
the World's History itself, -- as still incomplete, — 
the abstract final aim of history is not yet made the dis-
tinct object of desire and interest. While these limited 
sentiments are still unconscious of the purpose they are 
fulfilling, the universal principle is implicit in them, 
and is realizing itself through them. The question also 
assumes the form of the union of Freedom and Necessity; 
the latent abstract process of Spirit being regarded as 
Necessity, while that which exhibits itself in the con-
scious will of men, as their interest, belongs to the 
domain of Freedom.„,, 
I will endeavour to make what has been said more vivid 
and clear by examples„ 
The building of a house is, in the first instance, a 
subjective aim and design. On the other hand we have, as 
means, the several substances required for the work, — 
Iron, Wood, Stones. The elements are made use of in work-
ing up this material: fire to melt the iron, wind to 
blow the fire, water to set wheels in motion, in order to 
cut the wood, &c. The result is, that the wind, which 
has helped to build the house, is shut out by the house; 
so also are the violence of rains and floods, and the de-
structive powers of fire, so far as the house is made 
fire-proof. The stones and beams obey the law of gravity, 
— press downwards, — and so high walls are carried up. 
Thus the elements are made use of in accordance with their 
nature, and yet to co-operate for a product, by which 
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their operation is limited. Thus the passions of men are 
gratified; they develope themselves and their aims in ac-
cordance with their natural tendencies, and build up the 
edifice of human society; thus fortifying a position for 
Right and Order against themselves. 
The connection of events above indicated, involves 
also the fact, that in history an additional result is 
commonly produced by human actions beyond that which they 
aim at and obtain — that which they immediately recog-
nise and desire. They gratify their own interest; but 
something farther is thereby accomplished, latent in the 
actions in question, though not present to their conscious-
ness, and not included in their design. An analogous ex-
ample is offered in the case of a man who, from a feeling 
of revenge, — perhaps not an unjust one, but produced by 
injury on the other's part, -- burns that other man's 
house. A connection is immediately established between 
the deed itself and a train of circumstances not directly 
included in it, taken abstractedly. In itself it con-
sisted in merely presenting a small flame to a small por-
tion of a beam. Events not involved in that simple act 
follow of themselves. The part of the beam which was set 
fire to is connected with its remote portions; the beam 
itself is united with the woodwork of the house generally, 
and this with other houses; so that a wide conflagration 
ensues, which destroys the goods and chattels of many 
other persons besides his against whom the act of revenge 
was first directed; perhaps even costs not a few men their 
lives. This lay neither in the deed abstractedly, nor in 
the design of the man who committed it. But the action 
has a further general bearing. In the design of the doer 
it was only revenge executed against an individual in the 
destruction of his property, but it is moreover a crime, 
and that involves punishment also. This may not have been 
present to the mind of the perpetrator, still less in his 
intention; but his deed itself, the general principles it 
calls into play, its substantial content entails it. By 
this example I wish only to impress on you the considera-
tion, that in a simple act, something farther may be im-
plicated than lies in the intention and consciousness of 
the agent, The example before us involves, however, this 
additional consideration, that the substance of the act, 
consequently we may say the act itself, recoils upon the 
perpetrator, — reacts upon him with destructive tendency. 
This union of the two extremes — the embodiment of a 
general idea in the form of direct reality, and the eleva-
tion of a specialty into connection with universal truth — 
is brought to pass, at first sight, under the conditions 
of an utter diversity of nature between the two, and an 
indifference of the one extreme towards the other. The 
aims which the agents set before them are limited and 
special; but it must be remarked that the agents them-
selves are intelligent thinking beings. The purport of 
their desires is interwoven with general, essential 
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considerations of justice, good, duty, &c; for mere de-
sire — volition in its rough and savage forms — falls 
not within the scene and sphere of Universal History. 
Those general considerations, which form at the same time 
a norm for directing aims and actions, have a determinate 
purport; for such an abstraction as "good for its own 
sake," has no place in living reality. If men are to act, 
they must not only intend the Good, but must have decided 
for themselves whether this or that particular thing is a 
Good. What special course of action, however, is good or 
not, is determined, as regards the ordinary contingencies 
of private life, by the laws and customs of a State; and 
here no great difficulty is presented. Each individual 
has his position; he knows on the whole what a just, hon-
ourable course of conduct is. As to ordinary, private 
relations, the assertion that it is difficult to choose 
the right and good, — the regarding it as the mark of an 
exalted morality to find difficulties and raise scruples 
on that score, — may be set down to an evil or perverse 
will, which seeks to evade duties not in themselves of a 
perplexing nature; or, at any rate, to an idly reflective 
habit of mind — where a feeble will affords no sufficient 
exercise to the faculties, — leaving them therefore to 
find occupation within themselves, and to expend them-
selves on moral self-adulation. 
It is quite otherwise with the comprehensive relations 
that History has to do with. In this sphere are presented 
those momentous collisions between existing, acknowledged 
duties, laws, and rights, and those contingencies which 
are adverse to this fixed system; which assail and even 
destroy its foundations and existence; whose tenor may 
nevertheless seem good, — on the large scale advantageous, 
— yes, even indispensable and necessary. These contin-
gencies realise themselves in History: they involve a 
general principle of a different order from that on which 
depends the permanence of a people or a State. This prin-
ciple is an essential phase in the development of the 
creating Idea, of Truth striving and urging towards [con-
sciousness of] itself. Historical men — World-Historical 
Individuals — are those in whose aims such a general 
principles lies. 
Caesar, in danger of losing a position, not perhaps 
at that time of superiority, yet at least of equality with 
the others who were at the head of the State, and of suc-
cumbing to those who were just on the point of becoming 
his enemies, — belongs essentially to this category. 
These enemies — who were at the same time pursuing their 
personal aims — had the form of the constitution, and the 
power conferred by an appearance of justice, on their side. 
Caesar was contending for the maintenance of his position, 
honour, and safety; and, since the power of his opponents 
included the sovereignty over the provinces of the Roman 
Empire, his victory secured for him the conquest of that 
entire Empire; and he thus became — though leaving the 
form of the constitution — the Autocrat of the State. 
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That which secured for him the execution of a design, 
which in the first instance was of negative import — the 
Autocracy of Rome, — was, however, at the same time an 
independently necessary feature in the history of Rome 
and of the world. It was not, then, his private gain 
merely, but an unconscious impulse that occasioned the 
accomplishment of that for which the time was ripe. Such 
are all great historical men, — whose own particular 
aims involve those large issues which are the will of the 
World-Spirit. They may be called Heroes, inasmuch as 
they have derived their purposes and their vocation, not 
from the calm, regular course of things, sanctioned by 
the existing order; but from a concealed fount — one 
which has not attained to phenomenal, present existence, 
— from that inner Spirit, still hidden beneath the sur-
face, which, impinging on the outer world as on a shell, 
bursts it in pieces, because it is another kernel than 
that which belonged to the shell in question. They are 
men, therefore, who appear to draw the impulse of their 
life from themselves; and whose deeds have produced a 
condition of things and a complex of historical relations 
which appear to be only their interest, and their work. 
Such individuals had no consciousness of the general 
Idea they were unfolding, while prosecuting those aims of 
theirs; on the contrary, they were practical, political 
men. But at the same time they were thinking men, who 
had an insight into the requirements of the time — what 
was ripe for development. This was the very Truth for 
their age, for their world; the species next in order, so 
to speak, and which was already formed in the womb of 
time. It was theirs to know this nascent principle; the 
necessary, directly sequent step in progress, which their 
world was to take; to make this their aim, and to expend 
their energy in promoting it. World-historical men — 
the Heroes of an epoch — must, therefore, be recognised 
as its clear-sighted ones; their deeds, their words are 
the best of that time. Great men have formed purposes to 
satisfy themsleves, not others. Whatever prudent designs 
and counsels they might have learned from others, would 
be the more limited and inconsistent features in their 
career; for it was they who best understood affairs; from 
whom others learned, and approved, or at least acquiesced 
in — t h e i r policy. For that Spirit which had taken this 
fresh step in history is the inmost soul of all individ-
uals; but in a state of unconsciousness which the great 
men in question aroused. Their fellows, therefore, follow 
these soul-leaders; for they feel the irresistible power 
of their own inner Spirit thus embodied.... 
A World-historical individual is not so unwise as to 
indulge a variety of wishes to divide his regards. He is 
devoted to the One Aim, regardless of all else. It is 
even possible that such men may treat other great, even 
sacred interests, inconsiderately; conduct which is indeed 
obnoxious to moral reprehension. But so mighty a form 
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must trample down many an innocent flower — crush to 
pieces many an object in its path,... 
In contemplating the fate which virtue, morality, 
even piety experience in history, we must not fall into 
the Litany of Lamentations, that the good and pious often 
— or for the most part — fare ill in the world, while the 
evil-disposed and wicked prosper, The term prosperity is 
used in a variety of meanings — riches, outward honour, 
and the like. But in speaking of something which in and 
for itself constitutes an aim of existence, that so-called 
well or ill-faring of these or those isolated individuals 
cannot be regarded as an essential element in the rational 
order of the universe. With more justice than happiness, 
— or a fortunate environment for individuals, — it is 
demanded of the grand aim of the world's existence, that 
it should foster, nay involve the execution and ratifica-
tion of good, moral, righteous purposes. What makes men 
morally discontented (a discontent, by the bye, on which 
they somewhat pride themselves), is that they do not find 
the present adapted to the realization of aims which they 
hold to be right and just (more especially in modern 
times, ideals of political constitutions); they contrast 
unfavourably things as they are, with their idea of 
things as they ought to be. In this case it is not pri-
vate interest nor passion that desires gratification, but 
Reason, Justice, Liberty; and equipped with this title, 
the demand in question assumes a lofty bearing, and read-
ily adopts a position not merely of discontent, but of 
open revolt against the actual condition of the world. 
To estimate such a feeling and such views aright, the 
demands insisted upon, and the very dogmatic opinions 
asserted, must be examined. At no time so much as in our 
own, have such general principles and notions been ad-
vanced, or with greater assurance. If in days gone by, 
history seems to present itself as a struggle of passions; 
in our time — though displays of passion are not wanting 
— it exhibits partly a predominance of the struggle of 
notions assuming the authority of principles; partly that 
of passions and interests essentially subjective, but 
under the mask of such higher sanctions. The pretensions 
thus contended for as legitimate in the name of that 
which has been stated as the ultimate aim of Reason, pass 
accordingly, for absolute aims, — to the same extent as 
Religion, Morals, Ethics. Nothing, as before remarked, 
is now more common than the complaint that the ideals 
which imagination sets up are not realized — that these 
glorious dreams are destroyed by cold actuality. These 
Ideals — which in the voyage of life founder on the rocks 
of hard reality — may be in the first instance only sub-
jective, and belong to the idiosyncrasy of the individual, 
imagining himself the highest and wisest. Such do not 
properly belong to this category. For the fancies which 
the individual in his isolation indulges, cannot be the 
model for universal reality; just as universal law is not 
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designed for the units of the mass, These as such may, 
in fact, find their interests decidedly thrust into the 
background. But by the term "Ideal," we also understand 
the ideal of Reason, of the Good, of the True, Poets, as 
e.g. Schiller, have painted such ideals touchingly and 
with strong emotion, and with the deeply melancholy con-
viction that they could not be realized. In affirming, 
on the contrary, that the Universal Reason does realize 
itself, we have indeed nothing to do with the individual 
empirically regarded. That admits of degrees of better 
and worse, since here chance and speciality have received 
authority from the Idea to exercise their monstrous power. 
Much, therefore, in particular aspects of the grand phe-
nomenon might be found fault with. This subjective fault-
finding, — which, however, only keeps in view the indi-
vidual and its deficiency, without taking notice of Reason 
pervading the whole, — is easy; and inasmuch as it as-
serts an excellent intention with regard to the good of 
the whole, and seems to result from a kindly heart, it 
feels authorized to give itself airs and assume great 
consequence. It is easier to discover a deficiency in 
individuals, in states, and in Providence, than to see 
their real import and value. For in this merely negative 
fault-finding a proud position is taken, — one which 
overlooks the object, without having entered into it, — 
without having comprehended its positive aspect. Age 
generally makes men more tolerant; youth is always dis-
contented. The tolerance of age is the result of the 
ripeness of a judgment which, not merely as the result of 
indifference, is satisfied even with what is inferior; 
but, more deeply taught by the grave experience of life, 
has been led to perceive the substantial, solid worth of 
the object in question. The insight then to which — in 
contradistinction from those ideals — philosophy is to 
lead us, is, that the real world is as it ought to be — 
that the truly good — the universal divine reason — is 
not a mere abstraction, but a vital principle capable of 
realising itself. This Good, this Reason, in its most 
concrete form, is God. God governs the world; the actual 
working of his government — the carrying out of his plan 
— is the History of the World. This plan philosophy 
strives to comprehend; for only that which has been de-
veloped as the result of it, possesses bona fide reality. 
That which does not accord with it, is negative, worth-
less existence. Before the pure light of this divine 
Idea — which is no mere Ideal — the phantom of a world 
whose events are an incoherent concourse of fortuitous 
circumstances, utterly vanishes. Philosophy wishes to 
discover the substantial purport, the real side of the 
divine idea, and to justify the so much despised Reality 
of things; for Reason is the comprehension of the Divine 
work.... 
(3.) The third point to be analysed is, therefore — 
what is the object to be realized by these means; I.e. 
what is the form it assumes in the realm of reality. We 
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have spoken of means; but in the carrying out of a sub-
jective, limited aim, we have also to take into consider-
ation the element of a material, either already present 
or which has to be procured. Thus the question would 
arise: What is the material in which the Ideal of Reason 
is wrought out? The primary answer would be, — Person-
ality itself — human desires -- Subjectivity generally. 
In human knowledge and volition, as its material element, 
Reason attains positive existence. We have considered 
subjective volition where it has an object which is the 
truth and essence of a reality, viz, where it constitutes 
a great world-historical passion. As a subjective will, 
occupied with limited passions, it is dependent, and can 
gratify its desires only within the limits of this de-
pendence. But the subjective will has also a substantial 
life — a reality, — in which it moves in the region of 
essential being, and has the essential itself as the ob-
ject of its existence. This essential being is the union 
of the subjective with the rational Will: it is the moral 
Whole, the State, which is that form of reality in which 
the individual has and enjoys his freedom; but on the 
condition of his recognizing, believing in and willing 
that which is common to the Whole. And this must not be 
understood as if the subjective will of the social unit 
attained its gratification and enjoyment through that 
common Will; as if this were a means provided for its 
benefit; as if the individual, in his relations to other 
individuals, thus limited his freedom, in order that this 
universal limitation — the mutual constraint of all — 
might secure a small space of liberty for each. Rather, 
we affirm, are Law, Morality, Government, and they alone, 
the positive reality and completion of Freedom. Freedom 
of a low and limited order, is mere caprice; which finds 
its exercise in the sphere of particular and limited 
desires. 
Subjective volition — Passion — is that which sets 
men in activity, that which effects "practical" realiza-
tion. The Idea is the inner spring of action; the State 
is the actually existing, realized moral life. For it is 
the Unity of the universal, essential Will, with that of 
the individual; and this is "Morality," The Individual 
living in this unity has a moral life; possesses a value 
that consists in this substantiality alone, Sophocles in 
his Antigone, says, "The divine commands are not of yes-
terday, nor of to-day; no, they have an infinite existence, 
and no one could say whence they came." The laws of moral-
ity are not accidental, but are the essentially Rational. 
It is the very object of the State that what is essential 
in the practical activity of men, and in their dispositions, 
should be duly recognized; that it should have a manifest 
existence, and maintain its position. It is the absolute 
interest of Reason that this moral Whole should exist; and 
herein lies the justification and merit of heroes who have 
founded states, — however rude these may haye been. In 
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the history of the World, only those peoples can come 
under our notice which form a state. For it must be un-
derstood that this latter is the realization of Freedom, 
i.e. of the absolute final aim, and that it exists for 
Tts own sake. It must further be understood that all the 
worth which the human being possesses — all spiritual 
reality, he possesses only through the State. For his 
spiritual reality consists in this, that his own essence 
— Reason — is objectively present to him, that is pos-
sesses objective immediate existence for him. Thus only 
is he fully conscious; thus only is he a partaker of 
morality — of a just and moral social and political life. 
For Truth is the Unity of the universal and subjective 
Will; and the Universal is to be found in the State, in 
its laws, its universal and rational arrangements. The 
State is the Divine Idea as it exists on Earth. We have 
in it, therefore, the object of History in a more definite 
shape than before; that in which Freedom obtains objectiv-
ity, and lives in the enjoyment of this objectivity. For 
Law is the objectivity of Spirit; volition in its true 
form. Only that will which obeys law, is free; for it 
obeys itself — it is independent and so free. When the 
State or our country constitutes a community of existence; 
when the subjective will of man submits to laws, — the 
contradiction between Liberty and Necessity vanishes. The 
Rational has necessary existence, as being the reality 
and substance of things, and we are free in recognizing 
it as law, and following it as the substance of our own 
being. The objective and the subjective will are then 
reconciled, and present one identical homogeneous whole. 
For the morality (Sittlichkeit) of the State is not of 
that ethical (moralische) reflective kind, in which one's 
own conviction bears sway; this latter is rather the pecu-
liarity of the modern time, while the true antique moral-
ity is based on the principle of abiding by one's duty 
[to the state at large]. An Athenian citizen did what 
was required of him, as it were from instinct: but if I 
reflect on the object of my activity, I must have the con-
sciousness that my will has been called into exercise. 
But morality is Duty — substantial Right — a "second 
nature" as it has been justly called; for the first nature 
of man is his primary merely animal existence........ 
We have considered two aspects of Freedom, — the 
objective and the subjective; if, therefore, Freedom is 
asserted to consist in the individuals of a State all 
agreeing in its arrangements, it is evident that only the 
subjective aspect is regarded. The natural inference from 
this principle is, that no law can be valid without the 
approval of all. This difficulty is attempted to be ob-
viated by the decision that the minority must yield to 
the majority; the majority therefore bear the sway. But 
long ago J. J. Rousseau remarked, that in that case there 
would be no longer freedom, for the will of the minority 
would cease to be respected. At the Polish Diet each 
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single member had to give his consent before any politi-
cal step could be taken; and this kind of freedom it was 
that ruined the State, Besides, it is a dangerous and 
false prejudice, that the People alone have reason and 
insight, and know what justice is; for each popular fac-
tion may represent itself as the People, and the question 
as to what constitutes the State is one of advanced 
science, and not of popular decision. 
If the principle of regard for the individual will is 
recognized as the only basis of political liberty, viz., 
that nothing should be done by or for the State to which 
all the members of the body politic have not given their 
sanction, we have, properly speaking, no Constitution, 
The only arrangement that would be necessary, would be, 
first, a centre having no will of its own, but which 
should take into consideration what appeared to be the 
necessities of the State; and, secondly, a contrivance 
for calling the members of the State together, for taking 
the votes, and for performing the arithmetical operations 
of reckoning and comparing the number of votes for the 
different propositions, and thereby deciding upon them. 
The State is an abstraction, having even its generic ex-
istence in its citizens; but it is an actuality, and its 
simply generic existence must embody itself in individual 
will and activity. The want of government and political 
administration in general is felt; this necessitates the 
selection and separation from the rest of those who have 
to take the helm in political affairs, to decide concern-
ing them, and to give orders to other citizens, with a 
view to the execution of their plans. If e.g. even the 
people in a Democracy resolve on a war, a general must 
head the army. It is only by a Constitution that the 
abstraction — the State — attains life and reality; but 
this involves the distinction between those who command 
and those who obey. — Yet obedience seems inconsistent 
with liberty, and those who command appear to do the very 
opposite of that which the fundamental idea of the State, 
viz, that of Freedom, requires. It is, however, urged 
that, — though the distinction between commanding and 
obeying is absolutely necessary, because affairs could not 
go on without it -- and indeed this seems pnly a compul-
sory limitation, external to and even contravening freedom 
in the abstract — the constitution should be at least so 
framed, that the citizens may obey as little as possible, 
and the smallest modicum of free volition be left to the 
commands of the superiors; -- that the substance of that 
for which subordination is necessary, even in its most 
important bearings, should be decided and resolved on by 
the People -- by the will of many or of all the citizens; 
though it is supposed to be thereby provided that the 
State should be possessed of vigour and strength as a 
reality —- an individual unity...„,,,. 
The State is the Idea of Spirit in the external mani-
festation of human Will and its Freedom. It is to the 
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State, therefore, that change in the aspect of History 
indissolubly attaches itself; and the successive phases 
of the Idea manifest themselves in it as distinct polit-
ical principles. The Constitutions under which World-
Historical peoples have reached their culmination, are 
peculiar to them; and therefore do not present a gener-
ally applicable political basis. Were it otherwise, the 
differences of similar constitutions would consist only 
in a peculiar method of expanding and developing that 
generic basis; whereas they really originate in diversity 
of principle. From the comparison therefore of the polit-
ical institutions of the ancient World-Historical peoples, 
it so happens, that for the most recent principle of a 
Constitution — for the principle of our own times — 
nothing (so to speak) can be learned. In science and art 
it is quite otherwise; e.g., the ancient philosophy is so 
decidedly the basis of The modern, that it is inevitably 
contained in the latter, and constitutes its basis. In 
this case the relation is that of a continuous development 
of the same structure, whose foundation-stone, walls, and 
roof have remained what they were„ In Art, the Greek it-
self, in its original form, furnishes us the best models. 
But in regard to political constitution, it is quite 
otherwise: here the Ancient and the Modern have not 
their essential principle in common. Abstract defini-
tions and dogmas respecting just government, — importing 
that intelligence and virtue ought to b£ar sway -- are, 
indeed, common to both; But nothing is so absurd as to 
look to Greeks, Romans, or Orientals, for models for the 
political arrangements of our time. From/the East may be 
derived beautiful pictures of a patriarcnal condition, of 
paternal government, and of devotion to it on the part of 
peoples; from Greeks and Romans, descriptions of popular 
liberty. Among the latter we find the idea of a Free Con-
stitution admitting all the citizens to a share in delib-
erations and resolves respecting the affairs and laws of 
the Commonwealth. In our times, too, this is its general 
acceptation; only with this modification, that — since 
our states are so large, and there are so many of "the 
Many," the latter, — direct action being impossible, — 
should by the indirect method of elective substitution 
express their concurrence with resolves affecting the 
common weal; that is, that for legislative purposes gen-
erally, the people should be represented by deputies. The 
so-called Representative Constitution is that form of gov-
ernment with which we connect the idea of a free constitu-
tion; and this notion has become a rooted prejudice. On 
this theory People and Government are separated. But 
there is a perversity in this antithesis; an ill-
intentioned ruse designed to insinuate that the People 
are the totality of the State. Besides, the basis of 
this view is the principle of isolated individuality — 
the absolute validity of the subjective will — a dogma 
which we have already investigated. The great point is, 
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that Freedom in its Ideal conception has not subjective 
will and caprice for its principle, but the recognition 
of the universal will; and that the process by which 
Freedom is realized is the free development of its suc-
cessive stages. The subjective will is a merely formal 
determination — a carte blanche — not including what it 
is that is willed. Only the rational will is that uni-
versal principle which independently determines and un-
folds its own being, and develops its successive elemental 
phases as organic members........ 
History in general is therefore the development of 
Spirit in Time, as Nature is the development of the Idea 
in Space. 
If then we cast a glance over the World's-History 
generally, we see a vast picture of changes and trans-
actions; of infinitely manifold forms of peoples, states, 
individuals, in unresting succession. Everything that 
can enter into and interest the soul of man — all our 
sensibility to goodness, beauty, and greatness — is 
called into play- On every hand aims are adopted and 
pursued, which we recognize, whose accomplishment we 
desire — we hope and fear for them. In all these oc-
currences and changes we behold human action and suffer-
ing predominant; everywhere something akin to ourselves, 
and therefore everywhere something that excites our in-
terest for or against. Sometimes it attracts us by 
beauty, freedom, and rich variety, sometimes by energy 
such as enables even vice to make itself interesting. 
Sometimes we see the more comprehensive mass of some 
general interest advancing with comparative slowness, and 
subsequently sacrificed to an infinite complication of 
trifling circumstances, and so dissipated into atoms. 
Then, again, with a vast expenditure of power a trivial 
result is produced; while from what appears unimportant a 
tremendous issue proceeds. On every hand there is the 
motliest throng of events drawing us within the circle of 
its interest, and when one combination vanishes another 
immediately appears in its place. 
The general thought — the category which first pre-
sents itself in this restless mutation of individuals and 
peoples, existing for a time and then vanishing — is 
that of change at large. The sight of the ruins of some 
ancient sovereignty directly leads us to contemplate this 
thought of change in its negative aspect. What traveller 
among the ruins of Carthage, of Palmyra, Persepolis, or 
Rome, has not been stimulated to reflections on the tran-
siency of kingdoms and men, and to sadness at the thought 
of a vigorous and rich life now departed — a sadness 
which does not expend itself on personal losses and the 
uncertainty of one's own undertakings, but is a disinter-
ested sorrow at the decay of a splendid and highly cul-
tured national life! But the most consideration which 
allies itself with that of change, is, that change while 
it imports dissolution, involves at the same time the 
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rise of a new life — that while death is the issue of 
life, life is also the issue of death. This is a grand 
conception; one which the Oriental thinkers attained, 
and which is perhaps the highest in their metaphysics. 
In the idea of Metempsychosis we find it evolved in its 
relation to individual existence; but a myth more gener-
ally known, is that of the Phoenix as a type of the Life 
of Nature; eternally preparing for itself its funeral 
pile, and consuming itself upon it; but so that from its 
ashes it produced the new, renovated, fresh life. But 
this image is only Asiatic; oriental not occidental. 
Spirit — consuming the envelope of its existence — does 
not merely pass into another envelope, nor rise rejuvenes-
cent from the ashes of its previous form; it comes forth 
exalted, glorified, a purer spirit. It certainly makes 
war upon itself — consumes its own existence; but in 
this very destruction it works up that existence into a 
new form, and each successive phase becomes in its turn a 
material, working on which it exalts itself to a new grade. 
If we consider Spirit in this aspect — regarding 
its changes not merely as rejuvenescent transitions, i..e., 
returns to the same form, but rather as manipulations oT 
itself, by which it multiplies the material for future 
endeavours — we see it exerting itself in a variety of 
modes and directions; developing its powers and gratify-
ing its desires in a variety which is inexhaustible; be-
cause every one of its creations, in which it has already 
found gratification, meets it anew as material, and is a 
new stimulus to plastic activity. The abstract concep-
tion of mere change gives place to the thought of Spirit 
manifesting, developing, and perfecting its powers in 
every direction which its manifold nature can follow. 
What powers it inherently possesses we learn from the 
variety of products and formations which it originates. 
In this pleasurable activity, it has to do only with it-
self. As involved with the conditions of mere nature — 
internal and external — it.will indeed meet in these not 
only opposition and hindrance, but will often see its en-
deavours thereby fail; often sink under the complications 
in which it is entangled either by Nature or by itself. 
But in such case it perishes in fulfilling its own destiny 
and proper function, and even thus exhibits the spectacle 
of self-demonstration as spiritual activity. 
The very essence of Spirit is activity; it realizes its 
potentiality — makes itself its own deed, its own work — 
and thus it becomes an object to itself; contemplates it-
self as an objective existence. Thus is it with the 
Spirit of a people: it is a Spirit having strictly de-
fined characteristics, which erects itself into an 
objective world, that exists and persists in a particular 
religious form of worship, customs, constitution, and 
political l a w s , — in the whole complex of its institu-
tions, — in the events and transactions that make up its 
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history. That is its work — that is what this partic-
ular Nation is. Nations are what their deeds are. Every 
Englishman wiTl say: We are the men who navigate the 
ocean, and have the commerce of the world; to whom the 
East Indies belong and their riches; who have a parlia-
ment, juries, &c. — The relation of the individual to 
that Spirit is that he appropriates to himself this sub-
stantial existence; that it becomes his character and 
capability, enabling him to have a definite place in the 
world — to be something. For he finds the being of the 
people to which he belongs an already established, firm 
world — objectively present to him — with which he has 
to incorporate himself. In this its work, therefore — 
its world — the Spirit of the people enjoys its exist-
ence and finds its satisfaction. — A Nation is moral — 
virtuous — vigorous — while it is engaged in realizing 
its grand objects, and defends its work against external 
violence during the process of giving to its purposes an 
objective existence. The contradiction between its poten-
tial, subjective being — its inner aim and life — and 
its actual being is removed; it has attained full reality, 
has itself objectively present to it. But this having 
been attained, the activity displayed by the Spirit of 
the people in question is no longer needed; it has its 
desire. The Nation can still accomplish much in war and 
peace at home and abroad; but the living substantial soul 
itself may be said to have ceased its activity. The essen-
tial, supreme interest has consequently vanished from its 
life, for interest is present only where there is opposi-
tion. The nation lives the same kind of life as the indi-
vidual when passing from maturity to old age, — in the 
enjoyment of itself, — in the satisfaction of being 
exactly what it desired and was able to attain. Although 
its imagination might have transcended that limit, it 
nevertheless abandoned any such aspirations as objects of 
actual endeavour, if the real world was less than favour-
able to their attainment, — and restricted its aim by the 
conditions thus imposed. This mere customary life (the 
watch wound up and going on of itseiT) is that which 
brings on natural death. Custom is activity without op-
position, for which there remains only a formal duration; 
in which the fulness and zest that originally character-
ised the aim of life is out of the question, — a merely 
external sensuous existence which has ceased to throw it-
self enthusiastically into its object. Thus perish indi-
viduals, thus perish peoples by a natural death; and 
though the latter may continue in being, it is an exist-
ence without intellect or vitality; having no need of its 
institutions, because the need for them is satisfied, — 
a political nullity and tedium. In order that a truly 
universal interest may arise, the Spirit of a People must 
advance to the adoption of some new purpose: but whence 
can this new purpose originate? It would be a higher, 
more comprehensive conception of itself — a transcending 
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of its principle — but this very act would involve a 
principle of a new order, a new National Spirit. * 
* G. W. ¥~» Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of HisTory, trans 
J. Sibree (London: George "Beil and Sons, 1878T s"pp, 17-21, 24-
27, 28-32, 34, 36-38, 39-41, 44-46, 49-50, 75-78, 
